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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of trade openness on output volatility.
We find that trade openness generally increased output volatility, although
this eﬀect was stronger and more significant during 1950-1975 than during
1975-2000. However, if we split the sample into developed and developing
countries, we observe that more openness increased volatility in developing
countries, while it helped smooth output in developed countries. We also
find that the size of the government may have increased volatility in less
developed countries. Part of the positive relation between openness and
volatility may be explained by the positive relation between openness and
government size. Another important finding of this paper is that once
we control for government size and some measures of external risk, such
as terms of trade volatility and export concentration index, the eﬀect of
openness on the output volatility turns out to be negative.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally there has been a lot of interest in the relationship between
trade openness and the growth rate of output (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999).
Less attention has been devoted to the relation between trade openness and the
volatility of output. Theoretically, this relationship is not settled. On the one
hand, openness leads to specialization and to more volatility if sector-specific
shocks are prevalent. Also, Tornell et al (2003) shows that trade liberalization
is typically followed by financial liberalization. But more financial liberalization
is associated with more financial fragility, in the case of developing countries.
Through this channel we could think that more openness (i.e. trade liberal-
ization) implies more fluctuations in the GDP growth. On the other hand,
trade openness may also provide a way of cushioning oneself against country-
specific shocks, since the world economy as a whole is less prone to shocks
than individual countries (Krebs, Krishna and Maloney, 2004). The way output
volatility reacts to changes in the level of openness is an important question for
a number of reasons. First, if consumption smoothing is an issue, output (and
consumption) volatility may be costly in terms of welfare. Second, it has been
documented that higher volatility tends to lead to lower growth (Ramey and
Ramey, 1995). Third, volatility has disproportionately adverse eﬀects on the
poor countries (Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2000).
We use a data set of 111 countries going from 1950 to 2000. Our main find-
ings are the following. The correlation between openness and volatility tends to
be positive, although it is not always significant. The correlation has become
weaker over time though. Also, developing and developed countries exhibit dif-
ferent patterns. Less developed countries suﬀer from a stronger eﬀect of open-
ness on volatility, although the eﬀect has become weaker in recent decades. In
contrast, for developed countries, the eﬀect goes the other way: more openness
smoothens output volatility. Here again the eﬀect becomes weaker over time.
The degree of specialization and the volatility of the terms of trade do a good
job in explaining why openness increases output volatility. When controlling
for the size of the economy, the eﬀect of openness tends to weaken, and even
disappears. Larger economies are characterized by lower output volatility. This
is not surprising, as it is well known that larger countries are less prone to shocks
(Head, 1995). Also richer countries display less volatility in output.
We then try to delve deeper into the role of government spending. According
to Rodrik (1998), more open economies have larger governments in an attempt to
deal with increased volatility. This so called ”compensation theory” claims that
governments play a mitigating role on risk. In the case of developed countries,
we find evidence supporting that theory. Even after controlling for the degree
of openness, government continues to reduce output volatility. However, this
is no longer true for developing countries. Under some specifications, larger
governments in poorer countries lead to increased volatility.
Another interesting question is how the financial sector aﬀects output volatil-
ity. It is often argued that opening the capital account allows risk diversification,
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stabilizing, in this way, the economy. On the other hand, opening the capital
account makes the country more dependent on credit, which, in turn, could
make it more vulnerable. Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) show that financial
depth, measured by private credit to GDP, aﬀects output volatility in a non-
monotonic way: initially it tends to decrease volatility but too much private
credit ends up increasing output volatility. Also they do not find any evidence
for the stabilizing role of capital flows. On the other hand, Svaleryd and Vlachos
(2000) found a positive relationship between openness to trade and development
of financial markets, measured by proxies like liquid liabilities and credit to pri-
vate enterprises. So it is interesting to see how much of the eﬀect of openness on
output volatility is attributed to the development of financial markets. To inves-
tigate that, we introduced in our analysis some financial proxies such as black
market premium, foreign debt, credit to private sector and liquid liabilities. Our
results show that among these financial proxies only the black market premium
plays a role in explaining output volatility. In all but the developed economies
sample, the black market premium passed from being insignificant during the
period 1950-1975 to being highly significant over 1975-2000. Moreover a higher
average level of black market premium seems to increase output volatility while
a higher variability in the black market premium helps smoothing the volatility
of output.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the data
and present some simple regressions that give a first insight into how open-
ness aﬀects volatility of output. Section 3 includes some robustness tests of
the relationship between openness and volatility and presents the reasons for
including each variable into our regressions. This is followed by the presenta-
tion of the results and a possible interpretation of them. Section 4 presents the
government-volatility relationship. In the last section we summarize the results
and make some suggestions for future research.
2 A first look at the data
The data in this study comes from the Penn World Tables 6.1, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the World Bank and UNCTAD. We use a sample of
111 countries over the period 1950-2000. A detailed description of the data set
is presented in the Appendix 4. We start by running some simple regressions of
output volatility on the level of openness for the entire set of countries. Then
we will split the sample into developed and developing countries, and also check
whether the eﬀect of openness on output volatility changed over time. For that,
we consider two diﬀerent time periods (1950-1975 and 1975-2000).
Following Ramey and Ramey (1995) we take the standard deviation of the
growth rate of GDP per capita as our measure of output volatility. This con-
trasts with Hausmann and Gavin (1996) who define macroeconomic volatility
as the standard deviation of the level of GDP per capita. The problem with the
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last measure is that an economy which grows at a high but constant rate would
nevertheless display high volatility. We prefer a measure which is not sensitive
to growth in that way. For openness, we focus on the traditional measure:
openness =
imports+ exports
GDP
(%)
To just give an example, take the case of Mauritania and the United States.
Mauritania, with an openness level of 87.87 is 6.4 times more open than the
United States, with an openness level of 13.66. This big diﬀerence in the level
of openness corresponds to a diﬀerence of 0.100 in the volatility of output (0.025
in the United States and 0.125 in Mauritania). This, in relative terms, means
that Mauritania is 5 times more volatile than the United States. Therefore this
case seems to sustain the idea that more openness implies more output volatility.
Nevertheless this is just an example. The objective of this paper is to dig deeper
into the data and investigate if this hypothesis is, in fact, a more general and
robust result.
All countries, 1950-2000
   
vol  
G  
D  
P   
Volatility of output vs average level of openness   
Openness  11.2361  
     
242.957 
  
.017385   
    
  .20745   
     VOL_GDP=0.01422*lnOPEN - 0.00103  
Figure 1.
Figure 1 plots output volatility as a function of openness for the time pe-
riod 1950-2000, using the entire sample of 111 countries. As one can see from
the picture, there is a positive relationship between openness and volatility of
output: more open economies exhibit higher output volatility. A simple regres-
sion shows that, on average, an increase of 10% in openness increases output
volatility by 0.0015. This relation is significant at the 99% level.
When we split our sample into two time periods (1950-1975 and 1975-2000),
the positive relationship between openness and output volatility still persists
(see Figures 2 and 3 ) but it weakens over time. While during the period 1950-
1975 an average increase of 10% in the level of openness implied an increase of
0.0016 in volatility, during the second period (1975-2000) this impact decreased
to 0.0010. As shown by the results in Table 1, we also observe an important
decrease in the statistical significance of the openness coeﬃcient in the second
period. The coeﬃcient for openness in the first period is significant at the 99%
level while in the second period it remains significant only at the 90% level.
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All countries, 1950-1975
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openness  
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VOL_GDP= 0.0157*lnOPEN  - 0.005398  
Figure 2.
All countries, 1975-2000
   
V      O      L      _      R      G      D      P   
L      
openness  
12.0441  
     
255.048 
   
.015476   
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VOL_GDP=0.009*lnOPEN+  0.01328   
Figure 3.
For the sample of developed1 countries, the relation between openness and
output volatility is significant for the entire period (1950-2000) but not for
the two subperiods (1950-1975 and 1975-2000). For the sample of developing
countries, the coeﬃcient of openness on output volatility decreases over time and
also becomes less significant. Figure 4 shows the relationship between openness
and volatility of output for developed and developing countries subsamples.
As we can see from the graphs, the positive relationship does not disappear
if we split the sample. However, if we analyze the data set in more detail we
observe that countries like the United States and Belgium, with completely
diﬀerent trade regimes, display similar degrees of volatility. The United States
is a relatively closed economy with an openness index of 13.66 compared to
Belgium, where the openness level is 90.42. Over the period 1950-2000 they
display very similar degrees of volatility: 0.024 in USA versus 0.020 in Belgium.
1We call a developed country any country that has the average level of GDP per capita
higher than $6,000.
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This gives us an idea that the relationship between openness and volatility is not
as trivial as it might be thought. Moreover, in Table 1 we could observe that in
the case of developed countries the relationship is significant only if we consider
the entire period of time but it disappears when we split the time period. In
the case of less developed economies we have the same eﬀect as in the pooled
sample (i.e. with all the countries together). Not only does the coeﬃcient of
openness decrease over time, but its significance also decreases from the 99%
level before 1975 to only 90% after 1975.
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3 Robustness
The results above are nothing more than a first cut at the data. Clearly it
is necessary to control for other eﬀects which could have an impact on volatility
before jumping to the conclusion that greater openness leads to higher output
volatility. The existing literature has identified a number of other sources of
output volatility. In this section we start by summing up those other possible
explanatory variables. We then analyze whether the positive relation between
openness and output volatility is preserved once we include those control vari-
ables.
3.1 Control variables
We now give a list of all the control variables we use in our regressions, and
explain why they might have an eﬀect on output volatility.
• Country size and development
The way one country reacts to any shock depends on some basic charac-
teristics such as the size and the level of development. The most common
proxies used to measure these features are the population and the level of
GDP per capita. A number of cross-section analyses trying to explain out-
put volatility use GDP per capita and population as control variables and
most of the time they turn out to be significant (see for example Easterly,
Islam and Stiglitz (2000), Mobarak (2004), Tamirisa (1999), Wolf (2003),
Wu and Rapallo (1997)). Regarding the influence of these variables on
the output volatility, we expect a country with a higher level of GDP per
capita (or larger population) to exhibit lower fluctuations.
• Government expenditure
As argued by Rodrik (1996), government plays a risk-reducing role in
economies exposed to external risk by providing social insurance. There-
fore we would expect a negative influence of government expenditure on
output volatility in our analysis.
• Human capital
Mobarak (2004) and Wolf (2003) used the average level of human capi-
tal as a control variable to explain the observed volatility in output and
consumption. Both of them found that a country with a higher level of
human capital can better adapt to new situations, therefore its output and
consumption are less aﬀected by a shock. We should therefore expect, in
our analysis, a country with a higher level of human capital to display less
volatility in its GDP per capita.
• Financial markets proxies
A country’s capability to insure against shocks should be strongly related
to the extent to which the country has access to international financial
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markets. We would expect a more developed financial system to reduce
output volatility. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002), in their empirical study
of the relationship between openness and markets for risk, classify proxies
for financial development into three categories: the size of financial sector
(ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP), the financial system’s ability to allocate
credit (credit issued to private sector, divided by GDP) and the real interest
rate. They found evidence that all these proxies have a positive and strong
influence on the level of openness of a country. Lee (1993), using the black
market premium as a proxy for capital and exchange controls, found that
these controls tend to reduce trade. These are the reasons to think that
there could be a strong impact of these proxies on output volatility too.
• Foreign direct investment (FDI)
FDI generates some links between production processes across countries.
At first sight, one may think that this provides a way to alleviate country
specific shocks and thus decrease output volatility. However, Barrell and
Gottschalk (2004) test this hypothesis for the cases of US and UK and
find that the eﬀect of FDI on output volatility is not significant. We also
want to test this hypothesis in our cross-section analysis.
• Total investment
Investment plays a central role in output growth through the rate of return
on capital and the process of capital accumulation. Ramey and Ramey
(1995) show that investment has a strong negative eﬀect on the volatility
of GDP and we would expect the same relationship in our analysis: a
country with a higher level of investment should display less volatility in
its output.
• Inflation
Financial volatility could be an important factor aﬀecting output volatility
of an economy. Many papers find that inflation volatility has an important
positive eﬀect on consumption volatility (Wolf (2003), Wu and Rapallo
(1997)). Old Phillips curve models imply a permanent trade-oﬀ between
inflation and output. We would therefore expect to have a positive impact
of the volatility of inflation on output volatility.
• External risk proxies
Rodrik (1998) shows how the relationship between openness and govern-
ment size becomes weaker and even disappears when measures of external
risk are added. The proxies he used for measuring external risk are ex-
port concentration index and terms of trade volatility. He found empirical
confirmation of the fact that the eﬀect of openness on government size
is stronger in the economies with a higher export concentration index.
Moreover, he found that countries with more concentrated exports have
bigger governments. Hence we would expect to obtain that a country with
more concentrated exports displays higher volatility. Controlling for the
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volatility of terms of trade, Rodrik found that the openness coeﬃcient
turns out to be insignificant. This highlights the fact that the volatility of
the terms of trade is the channel through which openness aﬀects the size
of the government. In the light of these findings, we expect to obtain a
positive influence of the terms of trade volatility on output volatility and
the openness eﬀect to disappear.
• Geographical dummies
The relationship between openness and volatility could be aﬀected by a
common factor that aﬀects both variables. Geographical dummies are
standard candidates (see for example Mobarak (2004), Razin and Rose
(1992), Rodrik (1998), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002)).
3.2 Empirical results for the pooled sample
We start by looking at the entire sample of countries. Table 2 reports
the results for the time period 1950-2000, whereas Tables 3 and 4 look at the
subperiods 1950-1975 and 1975-2000. The number of control variables for the
second subperiod is greater, because of better data availability. Openness tends
to have a positive and significant eﬀect on output volatility. This eﬀect was both
greater and more significant in the period 1950-1975 than in the period 1975-
2000. If during the period 1950-1975 a 10% increase in the level of openness
would mean a 0.0015 increase in the volatility of output, over the period 1975-
2000 this impact decreases to only 0.0001. Moreover, if we pay attention to the
adjusted R2 as a measure of how the equations fit the reality, we can observe a
decrease over time in all the equations.
From the same tables we can observe that the control variables are always
significant and tend to have the expected sign: GDP per capita, human capital,
the level of investment and FDI inflows decrease volatility, whereas inflation
increases volatility. We also observe that regional dummies do not seem to have
any eﬀect on the volatility of output.
As reported in Table 4, once we control for the export concentration index,
openness ceases to have a positive eﬀect on volatility. We could only check for
this eﬀect during the period 1975-2000, because earlier data was insuﬃcient.
The result from this table seems to suggest that openness increases volatility
because openness leads to greater specialization, making the economy more
vulnerable to external (sectoral) shocks. This specification is also the one with
the highest adjusted R2 among all the regressions for the second period of time.
Our preliminary results suggest that it is crucial to control for the size of the
economy. This is not surprising: we would expect bigger countries to be more
diversified, and therefore less prone to external risk. Moreover, when controlling
for the size of the economy, it makes sense to make a distinction between a
greater size due to a larger population, or a greater size due to a higher GDP
per capita. We now redo our previous exercise, but in each regression we control
for population size and GDP per capita. These results are reported in Tables 5,
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6 and 7. In nearly all regressions both GDP per capita and population have a
negative and significant eﬀect on volatility. There is also a marked improvement
in the adjusted R2, suggesting that these two variables have high explanatory
power. The eﬀect of openness on volatility becomes smaller — even negative— and
less significant. Whereas for the time period 1950-1975 openness continues to be
statistically significant, this is no longer true for the period 1975-2000. During
the period 1975-2000 we observe a negative eﬀect of openness on volatility but
this eﬀect does not result to be significant at the 90% level. The main results
are therefore confirmed: openness tends to increase volatility, but much less –
or even not at all – in recent decades. As far as the other explanatory variables
are concerned, they tend to lose significance, once we include GDP per capita
and population. Only inflation continues to increase volatility and FDI inflow
continues to smooth output over 1950-1975. These eﬀects disappear over time,
though. During the second period, 1975-2000, only volatility in the terms of
trade results to have a significant positive influence on output volatility. As
before, this suggests that openness may increase output volatility because of a
higher exposure to external shocks. Introducing geographical dummy variables
does not improve results.
Another interesting question is to see whether the degree of trade openness
is proxying for the degree of openness of financial markets. As for the proxies for
financial development (see Tables 8, 9 and 10 ), only the black market premium,
foreign debt and liquid liabilities increase the explicative power of the regressions
in the second period of time. From these control variables only black market
premium is significant per se. We observe that a higher average level of black
market premium increases output volatility while more variability in the level of
black market premium smooths the volatility of GDP. An interesting issue here
is that the eﬀect of black market premium on output volatility becomes stronger
over time while the opposite happens with the openness eﬀect. This fact could
suggest that maybe trade openness is simply picking up financial openness.
3.3 Empirical results for the developed countries
We present the results for this group of countries in Tables 11-14. The
most unexpected result appears in Table 11 which suggests a strong negative
eﬀect of openness on volatility in developed countries during the period 1950-
1975. While in the pooled sample more openness meant more volatility, in the
case of developed economies a higher level of openness seems to help reducing
the volatility in GDP. Moreover this relationship is robust to the introduction
of all the control variables. This negative eﬀect is still apparent during the
period 1975-2000 but it loses significance (Table 12 ). Therefore more openness
helps smooth output volatility. The interpretation we can give to this somehow
unexpected finding is that openness oﬀers more possibilities for hedging against
country specific shocks.
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During the period 1950-1975 inflation proved to have a strong eﬀect in raising
volatility of output while over the next period its role was replaced by the
volatility in terms of trade and export concentration index, which explain more
than half of the volatility displayed by GDP. Another aspect presented in Tables
11-18 is the eﬀect of GDP per capita, which becomes highly significant only in
the second period, and population, which increases its significance during 1975-
2000. The regional dummies’ lack of eﬀect on volatility is still present in the
case of developed economies.
Tables 13 and 14 present the eﬀect of financial development proxies on
volatility in output in the case of developed countries. As in the pooled sam-
ple, none of these variables aﬀects volatility in the first period but this ”zero-
influence” is still present during the second period in the case of rich countries.
The only eﬀect they have is to decrease the significance of the openness coeﬃ-
cient. Taking a look at the R2-s we observe that controlling for financial proxies
in the case of rich economies does not help improve the explanatory power of
the regressions.
3.4 Empirical results for the developing countries
The results for the sample of developing countries are reported in Tables 15 to
18. There, like in the case of the entire sample, the highest level of significance
for openness is reached in the first subperiod of time. Moreover, we see that the
eﬀect of openness does not disappear once we control for the population size
and GDP per capita (see Table 1 and Tables 15, 16 ). Like in the case of the
total sample the combination openness, GDP, population and inflation explains
almost half of the variability in the GDP growth over the period 1950-1975. If
we take a look at Table 16 we observe that during the period 1975-2000 the
European location seems to be the only one that aﬀects output volatility in
poor countries. Also comparing Tables 15 and 16 we observe that, in terms
of the explanatory power, inflation’s role in the first period is replaced by that
of the volatility in terms of trade in the second period. In terms of financial
market accessibility (Tables 17 and 18 ), in the first subperiod we do not see
any influence of the financial proxies on volatility. In the second subperiod, we
see the same influence of the black market premium for the pooled sample. The
openness eﬀect on output volatility is replaced by the black market premium
eﬀect.
4 Government, Openness and Volatility
There is an important literature analyzing the relationship between open-
ness and government size. Rodrik (1998) suggests that more open economies
have greater exposure to the shocks in the world market. In an attempt to bet-
ter hedge against these shocks, more open economies have larger government
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spending. This is called the ”compensation theory” and it received empirical
support in Rodrik’s paper for a broad sample of countries. However, in a recent
study of OECD countries, Molana, Motagna and Violato (2004) claim that this
theory only holds for a limited number of countries.
The question we address in this section is slightly diﬀerent: when controlling
for openness, does government spending continue to have a mitigating eﬀect on
volatility? Table 19 shows the results of the regression of output volatility on
openness and government spending, distinguishing between diﬀerent time pe-
riods and splitting up the sample into rich and poor countries. For the entire
sample of countries, openness increases output volatility, and government size
decreases output volatility. This seems to reinforce the view of Rodrik (1998):
for a given level of openness, bigger governments reduce output volatility. How-
ever, splitting the sample into developed and less developed countries we see that
the government size eﬀect disappears in the case of less developed economies.
Table 20 presents the results of the same exercise when we controlled for the
level of GDP per capita and population. Once we do that, the mitigating eﬀect
of government spending on output volatility still appears only in the richer coun-
tries, over the period 1975-2000. In fact, for the entire sample of countries and
for the poorer countries, government spending now increases output volatility,
although the eﬀect is not significant.
We then continue our analysis by adding more control variables. In the
light of the ”compensation theory”, the government size interacts with prox-
ies for the external risk, represented in our analysis by volatility of terms of
trade and export concentration index. We check this theory using the same
kind of analysis Rodrik (1998) presented in his paper. One of the proxies for
external risk we use here is the export concentration index. Countries with a
more diversified set of exports are supposed to be less exposed to external risk.
The second proxy used in Rodrik’s paper is volatility of terms of trade which
is considered a measure of the terms of trade risk. The last measure, called the
interaction term, is generated by multiplying openness with these proxies. The
results are reported in Tables 21-23. As one could observe comparing these three
tables, the results in the case of low income countries are completely diﬀerent
from the pooled sample or rich countries. If in the last two samples we found
evidence of the compensation theory discussed by Rodrik, in the case of devel-
oping economies only the government eﬀect on volatility of output is strongly
significant. As in Rodrik’s paper, in the case of pooled sample and developed
economies, the coeﬃcients for interaction terms are significant, confirming that
the eﬀect of openness is stronger in countries with more concentrated exports or
more volatility in terms of trade. But in the case of poor countries, none of the
interaction terms result to be significant. Another big diﬀerence between the
pooled sample or rich countries sample and poor countries sample is the eﬀect
of openness. While the openness coeﬃcient becomes negative and significant in
the first two samples, it completely disappears in the case of poor economies.
For the case of rich economies, this result could be interpreted as an evidence
of the mitigating role played by government: more open economies are more
exposed to external risk, but at the same time more openness means bigger
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government which, in turn, can compensate for the negative eﬀects of shocks.
In conclusion, more openness means less volatility of output. In the poor coun-
tries not only can we not say the same, but the role played by the government
is completely diﬀerent: more government expenditure increases output volatil-
ity and this eﬀect remains strongly significant and positive irrespective of the
proxies for external shocks we add.
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored the relationship between trade openness and out-
put volatility. We have found that this relationship is a complex one. In devel-
oping countries more openness is associated with higher volatility. In contrast,
in developed countries openness smoothens output volatility. However, for both
samples the relationship has become weaker in recent decades.
An interesting feature we found in the case of developing countries is that the
decreasing eﬀect over time of openness on trade is associated with an increasing
eﬀect of the black market premium (as a proxy for financial development) on
output volatility. This fact could suggest that maybe trade openness is partly
picking up financial openness.
This paper also contributes to the empirical literature on testing the so
called ”compensation theory”, which states that more open countries have bigger
governments in an attempt to compensate for the exposure to external risk. We
found that this theory holds for developed but not for developing countries.
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7 Appendix 1: Data Description
In this appendix we will describe in detail the variables we use and the sources
we took them.
• volatility=standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP per capita
in constant prices: Laspeyres index (Penn World Tables 6.1) (1950-2000)
• OPEN=average level of openness ((imports+exports) as percentage of
GDP) (1950-2000) (Penn World Tables 6.1)
• openness=log(OPEN)
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• total GDP=log of the average level of GDP Laspeyres index (1950-2000)
(Penn World Tables 6.1)
• GDP per capita=log of the average level of GDP per capita Laspeyres
index (1950-2000) (Penn World Tables 6.1)
• population=log of the average level of population (1950-2000) (PennWorld
Tables 6.1)
• human capital=average level of human capital (Barro & Lee data 1960-
2000: average years of school)
• FDI inflow=log of the average FDI (foreign direct investment) inflow
(1970-2000) (IMF-IFS: International Monetary Fund-International Finan-
cial Statistics)
• investment=log of the average investment (1950-2000) (PennWorld Tables
6.1)
• government=log of the average level of government expenditure (1950-
2000) (Penn World Tables 6.1)
• export index=export concentration index (averaged 1980-2000) (UNC-
TAD Handbook of Statistics)
This is a modified version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index:
Hi =
s
239P
i=1
(
Eij
Ei.
)2 −
q
1
239
1−
q
1
239
where Hi=concentration index for country i, Eij=value of export of product j
and country i, Ei. =
239P
j=1
Eij
• terms of trade=standard deviation of the terms of trade (1980-2000) (UNC-
TAD Handbook of Statistics)
• inflation=standard deviation of inflation (1950-2000) (consumption price
index: Penn World Tables 6.1)
• black market premium av=black market premium average level (exchange
rate in the black market, divided by the oﬃcial rate) (average 1960-1999)
(”Global Development Network Growth Database”, Easterly & Sewadeh,
World Bank)
• black market premium vol=black market premium volatility (standard de-
viation over the period 1960-1999) (”Global Development Network Growth
Database”, Easterly & Sewadeh, World Bank)
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• interest rate= standard deviation of the national interest rate (IMF-IFS)
(1950-2000)
• liquid liabilities=average liquid liabilities % GDP (IMF-IFS) (1950-2000)
• credit to private sector=average credit to private sector % GDP (IMF_IFS)
(1950-2000)
• foreign debt=average foreign debt % GDP (IMF_IFS) (1950-2000)
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8 Appendix 2: Tables
.
Sample All countries Rich countries Poor countries
Time Period (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Openness 0.0142
(3.19)
0.0157
(5.12)
0.0093
(1.58)
0.0093
(2.27)
0.0018
(0.61)
0.0033
(0.82)
0.0168
(2.49)
0.0172
(4.51)
0.0191
(1.81)
N-obs 111 111 111 40 25 44 71 86 67
Adj-R2 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.00 0.07 0.18 0.03
Table 1: Openness and Volatility
N= nr of observations, t-statistics in parenthesis
(1) all the interval:1950-2000 (2)1st subperiod: 1950-1975, (3) 2nd subperiod: 1975-2000
8.1 The entire sample (all countries)
Time Period 1950-2000
Openness 0.0142
(3.19)
0.0129
(3.25)
−0.0025
(−0.53)
0.0054
(0.96)
0.0138
(3.43)
0.0109
(3.35)
0.0138
(3.37)
0.0072
(2.09)
0.0103
(2.41)
GDP per capita −0.0137
(−5.27)
Total GDP −0.0095
(−5.88)
Population −0.0053
(−2.46)
Investment −0.009
(−5.00)
Human Capital −0.0032
(−4.08)
Inflation 0.1467
(4.51)
FDI Inflow −0.0050
(−5.28)
Europe −0.0085
(−0.57)
Africa 0.0263
(1.84)
Asia 0.0053
(0.35)
North America −0.0011
(−0.08)
South America 0.0055
(0.35)
N-obs 111 111 111 111 111 92 111 91 111
Adj-R2 0.07 0.26 0.29 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.23
Table 2: All countries, 1950-2000
Time period 1950-1975
Openness 0.0157
(5.12)
0.0134
(4.56)
0.0071
(1.96)
0.0123
(3.34)
0.0147
(5.07)
0.0136
(4.99)
0.0162
(6.17)
0.0129
(4.41)
0.0121
(4.15)
GDP per capita −0.0112
(−4.09)
Total GDP −0.0065
(−4.01)
Population −0.003
(−1.63)
Investment −0.00652
(−3.92)
Human Capital −0.0032
(−3.55)
Inflation 0.0162
(6.43)
FDI Inflow −0.0039
(−3.86)
Europe −0.0134
(−1.03)
Africa 0.0186
(1.47)
Asia 0.0095
(0.72)
North America −0.0111
(−0.83)
South America −0.0003
(−0.03)
N-obs. 111 111 111 111 111 92 111 91 111
Adj-R2 0.19 0.29 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.35 0.41 0.29 0.35
Table 3: All countries, 1950-1975
Time period 1975-2000
Openness 0.0093
(1.58)
0.0117
(2.22)
−0.0101
(−1.71)
−0.0058
(−0.78)
0.0121
(2.26)
0.0066
(1.53)
0.0083
(1.46)
0.0017
(0.41)
0.0016
(0.38)
0.0132
(2.15)
0.008
(1.40)
GDP per capita −0.0161
(−5.53)
Total GDP −0.0114
(−6.43)
Population −0.0082
(−3.15)
Investment −0.0108
(−5.09)
Human Capital −0.0031
(−3.45)
Inflation 0.1065
(3.08)
FDI Inflow −0.0054
(−4.88)
Export Index 0.0681
(5.80)
Terms of Trade 0.0005
(3.32)
Europe −0.008
(−0.43)
Africa 0.0294
(1.64)
Asia 0.0005
(0.03)
North America 0.0048
(0.25)
South America 0.0114
(0.57)
N-obs 111 111 111 111 111 92 111 91 107 97 111
Adj-R2 0.01 0.22 0.28 0.09 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.14
Table 4: All countries, 1975-2000
Time Period 1950-2000
Openness 0.00158
(0.32)
0.00019
(0.04)
0.0052
(1.30)
0.0028
(0.60)
0.0042
(0.90)
−0.0003
(−0.07)
GDP per capita −0.0149
(−5.98)
−0.0229
(−2.66)
−0.0097
(−2.28)
−0.0127
(−5.15)
−0.0111
(−2.22)
−0.0107
(−2.90)
Population −0.0068
(−3.60)
−0.0073
(−3.72)
−0.0034
(−2.20)
−0.006
(−3.28)
−0.0034
(−1.29)
−0.0072
(−3.39)
Investment 0.0056
(0.97)
Human Capital −0.0004
(−0.30)
Inflation 0.099
(3.31)
FDI Inflow −0.0008
(−0.36)
Europe 0.0023
(0.17)
Africa 0.0158
(1.09)
Asia 0.0125
(0.84)
North America −0.0013
(−0.09)
South America 0.0038
(0.26)
N-obs 111 111 92 111 91 111
Adj-R2 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.39 0.31 0.33
Table 5: All countries, 1950-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time period 1950-1975
Openness 0.0079
(2.26)
0.0077
(2.05)
0.0103
(3.15)
0.0111
(3.49)
0.0118
(3.20)
0.0069
(2.01)
GDP per capita −0.0126
(−4.63)
−0.0137
(−2.08)
−0.0022
(−0.48)
−0.0092
(−3.73)
−0.0036
(−0.93)
−0.0046
(−1.27)
Population −0.0045
(−2.63)
−0.0046
(−2.56)
−0.0029
(−1.81)
−0.0027
(−1.73)
−0.0006
(−0.31)
−0.0048
(−2.68)
Investment 0.0007
(0.20)
Human Capital −0.0027
(−1.81)
Inflation 0.1368
(5.46)
FDI Inflow −0.0031
(−2.21)
Europe −0.0085
(−0.66)
Africa 0.0153
(1.15)
Asia 0.0144
(1.04)
North America −0.0107
(−0.81)
South America 0.00043
(0.03)
N-obs. 111 111 92 111 91 111
Adj-R2 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.47 0.29 0.38
Table 6 All countries, 1950-1975, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time period 1975-2000
Openness −0.0035
(−0.55)
−0.0066
(−1.00)
−0.0019
(−0.38)
−0.0034
(−0.54)
−0.0045
(−0.85)
−0.0007
(−0.14)
−0.0085
(−1.31)
−0.0043
(−0.58)
GDP per capita −0.0161
(−5.86)
−0.0361
(−3.22)
−0.0181
(−3.91)
−0.0148
(−5.24)
−0.0154
(−4.05)
−0.0102
(−3.57)
−0.0129
(−4.56)
−0.0152
(−3.57)
Population −0.0083
(−3.64)
−0.0095
(−4.05)
−0.0049
(−2.72)
−0.0078
(−3.46)
−0.0064
(−2.84)
−0.0042
(−2.19)
−0.0111
(−4.97)
−0.0085
(−3.15)
Investment 0.0148
(1.84)
Human Capital 0.0025
(1.55)
Inflation 0.0519
(1.66)
FDI Inflow 0.0007
(0.44)
Export Index 0.0288
(1.91)
Terms of Trade 0.0005
(3.72)
Europe 0.0080
(0.46)
Africa 0.0102
(0.58)
Asia 0.0093
(0.51)
North America 0.0042
(0.24)
South America 0.0072
(0.39)
N-obs 111 111 92 111 91 107 97 111
Adj-R2 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.41 0.27
Table 7: All countries, 1975-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1950-2000
Openness −0.0005
(−0.11)
0.00306
(0.40)
−0.0025
(−0.38)
0.0030
(0.67)
0.0033
(0.67)
GDP per capita −0.0120
(−5.09)
−0.01222
(−3.70)
−0.0138
(−4.80)
−0.0122
(−5.42)
−0.0140
(−5.30)
Population −0.0068
(−3.33)
−0.0057
(−2.11)
−0.0062
(−2.82)
−0.0055
(−3.11)
−0.007
(−3.12)
Black Market Premium Av. 0.00015
(3.46)
Black Market Premium Vol. −0.00003
(−3.24)
St. dev of Interest Rate 0.00005
(0.40)
Foreign Debt 4.47E − 16
(0.95)
Credit to Private Sector 7.97E − 16
(0.76)
Liquid Liabilities 0.000
(1.00)
N-obs 92 43 36 93 73
Adj-R2 0.37 0.33 0.44 0.34 0.36
Table 8: Financial proxies: all countries, 1950-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1950-1975
Openness 0.0065
(1.56)
0.0019
(0.39)
−0.0074
(−1.30)
0.00891
(2.25)
0.0111
(2.38)
GDP per capita −0.0113
(−3.66)
−0.0097
(−2.91)
−0.0173
(−4.29)
−0.0101
(−3.25)
−0.0094
(−2.56)
Population −0.0047
(−2.12)
−0.0034
(−1.45)
−0.0091
(−3.53)
−0.0046
(−2.35)
−0.0049
(−1.85)
Black Market Premium Av. −0.0000
(−0.50)
Black Market Premium Vol. 8.84E − 06
(0.40)
St. dev of Interest Rate −0.0060
(−1.50)
Foreign Debt 2.77E − 11
(0.94)
Credit to Private Sector 2.04E − 14
(0.46)
Liquid Liabilities 0.000
(1.08)
N-obs 92 43 36 93 73
Adj-R2 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.28 0.25
Table 9: Financial proxies: all countries, 1950-1975, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1975-2000
Openness −0.0034
(−0.56)
0.0068
(0.59)
0.0034
(0.48)
−0.0057
(−1.04)
−0.0065
(−1.12)
GDP per capita −0.0120
(−4.73)
−0.0128
(−3.55)
−0.0127
(−5.17)
−0.0134
(−5.90)
−0.0160
(−6.20)
Population −0.006
(−2.71)
−0.0064
(−1.83)
−0.0038
(−1.81)
−0.0071
(−3.53)
−0.0090
(−3.67)
Black Market Premium Av. 0.0001
(3.12)
Black Market Premium Vol. −0.00003
(−2.93)
St. dev of Interest Rate 0.0001
(0.77)
Foreign Debt 2.23E − 16
(0.61)
Credit to Private Sector 1.72E − 16
(0.29)
Liquid Liabilities 0.00002
(1.14)
N-obs 92 43 36 93 73
Adj-R2 0.32 0.30 0.44 0.33 0.40
Table 10: Financial proxies: all countries, 1975-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
8.2 Developed countries
Time period 1950-1975
Openness −0.0094
(−2.10)
−0.0094
(−2.06)
−0.0106
(−2.12)
−0.0036
(−0.89)
−0.0227
(−3.19)
−0.0064
(−1.54)
GDP per capita −0.0108
(−1.34)
−0.0159
(−1.18)
−0.0065
(−0.59)
0.0000
(0.01)
−0.0079
(−0.91)
−0.0045
(−0.52)
Population −0.0071
(−3.12)
−0.0069
(−2.89)
−0.0075
(−2.97)
−0.0037
(−1.68)
−0.0130
(−3.89)
−0.0065
(−3.14)
Investment 0.0050
(0.48)
Human Capital −0.0014
(−0.81)
Inflation 0.1299
(3.25)
FDI Inflow 0.0027
(1.46)
Europe −0.0079
(−1.04)
Asia 0.0110
(1.03)
North America −0.0031
(−0.31)
South America 0.0095
(0.94)
N-obs. 25 25 23 25 21 25
Adj-R2 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.49 0.44 0.44
Table 11: Developed countries, 1950-1975, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time period 1975-2000
Openness −0.0053
(−1.29)
−0.0041
(−0.97)
−0.0052
(−1.43)
−0.0014
(−0.31)
−0.0049
(−1.31)
−0.0038
(−0.98)
−0.006
(−1.30)
−0.0060
(−1.19)
GDP per capita −0.0227
(−4.50)
−0.0065
(−0.47)
−0.0236
(−3.76)
−0.0201
(−3.91)
−0.0188
(−3.81)
−0.0154
(−2.81)
−0.0100
(−1.42)
−0.0151
(−2.32)
Population −0.0064
(−3.91)
−0.0056
(−3.24)
−0.0054
(−3.97)
−0.0049
(−2.77)
−0.0055
(−3.57)
−0.0035
(−2.00)
−0.0081
(−4.31)
−0.0063
(−3.41)
Investment −0.0121
(−1.25)
Human Capital 0.0011
(0.86)
Inflation 0.0868
(1.74)
FDI Inflow 0.0000
(0.06)
Export Index 0.0487
(2.91)
Terms of Trade 0.00033
(2.69)
Europe 0.0053
(0.50)
Africa 0.0201
(1.49)
Asia 0.0094
(0.74)
North America 0.0193
(1.59)
South America 0.0149
(1.14)
N-obs 44 44 40 44 37 43 34 44
Adj-R2 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.49
Table 12: Developed countries, 1975-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1950-1975
Openness −0.0087
(−1.37)
−0.0069
(−0.80)
−0.0137
(−1.76)
−0.0106
(−2.03)
−0.0068
(−1.48)
GDP per capita −0.0074
(−0.72)
−0.0179
(−0.94)
−0.0223
(−1.41)
−0.0096
(−0.93)
−0.0183
(−1.93)
Population −0.0066
(−0.87)
−0.0064
(−1.57)
−0.0094
(−2.35)
−0.0073
(−2.74)
−0.0078
(−3.78)
Black Market Premium Av. 0.00002
(0.39)
Black Market Premium Vol. 0.00008
(0.56)
St. dev of Interest Rate 0.0127
(1.08)
Foreign Debt 9.77E − 10
(0.03)
Credit to Private Sector 1.61E − 16
(0.01)
Liquid Liabilities 3.42E − 06
(0.64)
N-obs 22 10 12 22 17
Adj-R2 0.09 -0.05 0.42 0.20 0.47
Table 13: Financial proxies: Developed countries, 1950-1975, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1975-2000
Openness −0.0048
(−0.90)
0.0142
(0.62)
−0.0005
(−0.09)
−0.0059
(−1.18)
−0.0055
(−0.95)
GDP per capita −0.0200
(−3.03)
−0.0364
(−2.31)
−0.0163
(−3.04)
−0.0237
(−3.88)
−0.0243
(−3.23)
Population −0.0067
(−2.70)
−0.0034
(−0.61)
−0.0025
(−1.44)
−0.0067
(−3.62)
−0.0078
(−2.96)
Black Market Premium Av. 0.0003
(0.56)
Black Market Premium Vol. −0.0002
(−0.47)
St. dev of Interest Rate −0.0019
(−1.52)
Foreign Debt 5.25E − 11
(0.24)
Credit to Private Sector 1.03E − 15
(0.23)
Liquid Liabilities 0.00001
(1.38)
N-obs 34 13 15 37 26
Adj-R2 0.36 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.38
Table 14: Financial proxies: Developed countries, 1975-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
8.3 Less developed countries
Time period 1950-1975
Openness 0.0119
(2.87)
0.0119
(2.66)
0.0140
(3.73)
0.0148
(4.00)
0.0149
(3.51)
−0.0069
(−0.55)
GDP per capita −0.0122
(−2.73)
−0.0123
(−1.51)
−0.0007
(−0.12)
−0.0103
(−2.63)
−0.0002
(−0.04)
−0.0154
(−1.80)
Population −0.0050
(−2.45)
−0.0050
(−2.31)
−0.0029
(−1.49)
−0.0035
(−1.95)
−0.0008
(−0.34)
−0.0149
(−3.42)
Investment 0.0001
(0.02)
Human Capital −0.0037
(−1.81)
Inflation 0.1394
(4.95)
FDI Inflow −0.0029
(−1.74)
Europe 0.0144
(0.66)
Africa 0.0189
(1.01)
Asia 0.0232
(1.17)
North America −0.0082
(−0.43)
South America 0.0079
(0.39)
N-obs. 86 86 69 86 70 86
Adj-R2 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.42 0.21 0.32
Table 15: Less developed countries, 1950-1975, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time period 1975-2000
Openness 0.0036
(0.29)
−0.003
(−0.23)
0.0006
(0.06)
0.00102
(0.08)
−0.00203
(−0.18)
0.0084
(0.84)
−0.0092
(−0.81)
−0.0069
(−0.55)
GDP per capita −0.0159
(−2.17)
−0.0408
(−2.47)
−0.0166
(−1.95)
−0.0148
(−2.01)
−0.0188
(−2.07)
−0.0123
(−2.02)
−0.0181
(−2.73)
−0.0154
(−1.80)
Population −0.0091
(−2.44)
−0.0109
(−2.85)
−0.0045
(−1.37)
−0.0091
(−2.44)
−0.0075
(−1.46)
−0.0036
(−1.21)
−0.0130
(−3.83)
−0.0150
(−3.42)
Investment 0.0182
(1.67)
Human Capital 0.0045
(1.55)
Inflation 0.0423
(1.00)
FDI Inflow 0.00189
(0.42)
Export Index 0.0155
(0.71)
Terms of Trade 0.0007
(3.15)
Europe 0.1385
(3.09)
Africa 0.0153
(0.56)
Asia 0.0298
(1.00)
North America −0.0007
(−0.03)
South America 0.0057
(0.19)
N-obs 67 67 52 67 54 64 63 67
Adj-R2 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.33 0.26
Table 16: Less developed countries, 1975-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1950-1975
Openness 0.0103
(2.03)
0.0040
(0.66)
−0.0015
(−0.18)
0.0133
(2.84)
0.0140
(2.51)
GDP per capita −0.009
(−1.85)
−0.0094
(−1.49)
−0.0224
(−2.26)
−0.0087
(−1.70)
−0.0094
(−1.39)
Population −0.005
(−1.80)
−0.0036
(−1.15)
−0.0106
(−2.84)
−0.00505
(−2.10)
−0.0057
(−1.52)
Black Market Premium Av. −0.00003
(−0.39)
Black Market Premium Vol. 0.00001
(0.34)
St dev of Interest Rate −0.0063
(−1.32)
Foreign Debt 4.86E − 11
(1.30)
Credit to Private Sector 4.93E − 11
(1.22)
Liquid Liabilities 0.00061
(0.53)
N-obs 70 33 24 71 56
Adj-R2 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.16
Table 17: Financial proxies: Less developed countries, 1950-1975, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1975-2000
Openness 0.0103
(0.03)
0.0046
(0.33)
0.0116
(1.00)
−0.0024
(−0.24)
−0.0046
(−0.46)
GDP per capita −0.0142
(−2.28)
−0.0183
(−2.20)
−0.0164
(−2.12)
−0.0155
(−2.65)
−0.0202
(−3.26)
Population −0.0057
(−1.65)
−0.0074
(−1.60)
−0.0050
(−1.55)
−0.0066
(−1.91)
−0.0097
(−2.43)
Black Market Premium Av. 0.0001
(2.45)
Black Market Premium Vol. −0.00003
(−2.32)
St. dev of Interest Rate 0.00013
(0.91)
Foreign Debt 4.70E − 16
(0.94)
Credit to Private Sector 2.75E − 16
(0.37)
Liquid Liabilities 0.00003
(0.40)
N-obs 58 30 21 56 47
Adj-R2 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.12 0.24
Table 18: Financial proxies: Less developed countries, 1975-2000, controlling for GDP per capita and population
8.4 Government, Openness and Volatility
Sample All countries Rich countries Poor countries
Time Period (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Openness 0.0143
(3.39)
0.0146
(4.85)
0.0129
(2.27)
0.0094
(2.52)
0.00209
(0.70)
0.0047
(1.23)
0.0173
(2.53)
0.0172
(4.51)
0.0218
(1.96)
Government −0.0106
(−3.54)
−0.007
(−2.75)
−0.0136
(−3.78)
−0.0166
(−2.99)
−0.005
(−1.02)
−0.0153
(−2.54)
−0.0031
(−0.59)
−0.0027
(−0.73)
−0.0055
(−0.78)
N-obs 111 111 111 40 25 44 71 86 67
Adj-R2 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.25 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.03
Table 19: Government, openness and volatility
Sample All countries Rich countries Poor countries
Time Period (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Openness 0.00182
(0.37)
0.00803
(2.27)
−0.0038
(−0.59)
−0.0020
(−0.47)
−0.0092
(−1.99)
−0.0065
(−1.62)
0.00456
(0.60)
0.0120
(2.88)
−0.0006
(−0.05)
GDP per capita −0.0197
(−3.83)
−0.0151
(−3.18)
−0.0231
(−3.84)
−0.0144
(−1.82)
−0.0089
(−0.94)
−0.0162
(−2.78)
−0.0298
(−3.10)
−0.0151
(−2.44)
−0.0323
(−2.58)
Population −0.0063
(−3.28)
−0.0044
(−2.53)
−0.0077
(−3.33)
−0.0065
(−3.47)
−0.007
(−2.99)
−0.0072
(−4.47)
−0.0062
(−2.22)
−0.0047
(−2.29)
−0.0082
(−2.22)
Government 0.0059
(1.05)
0.0028
(0.66)
0.0091
(1.30)
−0.0128
(−2.22)
−0.0020
(−0.41)
−0.0111
(−2.05)
0.0152
(1.87)
0.0036
(0.69)
0.0183
(1.61)
N-obs 111 111 111 40 25 44 71 86 67
Adj-R2 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.51 0.23 0.51 0.23 0.26 0.18
Table 20: Government, openness and volatility, controlling for GDP per capita and population
Time Period 1975-2000
Openness (OPEN) −0.0049
(−1.06)
−0.0136
(−2.25)
−0.0058
(−1.17)
−0.0163
(−2.38)
−0.0053
(−1.12)
−0.0197
(−2.87)
GDP per capita −0.0186
(−4.31)
−0.0177
(−4.16)
−0.0157
(−3.27)
−0.0158
(−3.35)
−0.0178
(−3.85)
−0.0183
(−4.09)
Population −0.0074
(−4.47)
−0.0078
(−4.79)
−0.0048
(−2.69)
−0.0051
(−2.88)
−0.007
(−3.78)
−0.0081
(−4.31)
Government 0.0096
(1.95)
0.0085
(1.75)
0.0092
(1.76)
0.0074
(1.44)
0.0096
(1.94)
0.0074
(1.52)
Terms of Trade (TOT) 0.0004
(4.19)
−0.0004
(−0.18)
0.0004
(3.14)
0.0001
(0.44)
Export Concentration Index (EXP) 0.0375
(2.66)
−0.0056
(−0.23)
0.0078
(0.48)
−0.0397
(−1.60)
TOT*OPEN 7.79E − 06
(2.18)
5.66E − 06
(1.33)
EXP*OPEN 0.0005
(2.18)
0.0005
(1.77)
N-obs 94 94 94 94 94 94
Adj-R2 0.47 0.49 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.50
Table 21: All countries: Government, openness and proxies for risk
Time Period 1975-2000
Openness (OPEN) −0.0063
(−1.31)
−0.0133
(−2.65)
−0.0066
(−1.40)
−0.0155
(−2.67)
−0.0065
(−1.40)
−0.0172
(−2.97)
GDP per capita −0.0094
(−1.27)
−0.0065
(−0.96)
−0.0096
(−1.34)
−0.0111
(−1.65)
−0.0073
(−1.01)
−0.0077
(−1.14)
Population −0.0083
(−4.19)
−0.0079
(−4.45)
−0.0051
(−2.34)
−0.0046
(−2.27)
−0.0061
(−2.66)
−0.0065
(−2.89)
Government −0.0020
(−0.28)
−0.0042
(−0.64)
−0.0075
(−1.19)
−0.0051
(−0.85)
−0.0033
(−0.48)
−0.0013
(−0.21)
Terms of Trade (TOT) 0.0003
(2.22)
−0.0009
(−0.45)
0.0002
(1.28)
0.0001
(0.33)
Export Concentration Index (EXP) 0.0484
(2.50)
−0.0152
(−0.47)
0.036
(1.68)
−0.0324
(−0.97)
TOT*OPEN 7.86E − 06
(2.72)
3.85E − 06
(0.98)
EXP*OPEN 0.0008
(2.34)
0.0006
(1.71)
N-obs 34 34 34 34 34 34
Adj-R2 0.56 0.64 0.57 0.63 0.58 0.65
Table 22: Developed countries: Government, openness and proxies for risk
Time Period 1975-2000
Openness (OPEN) −0.0060
(−0.76)
−0.0226
(−1.60)
−0.0070
(−0.82)
−0.0179
(−1.29)
−0.0062
(−0.74)
−0.0294
(−1.91)
GDP per capita −0.0334
(−4.17)
−0.0332
(−4.18)
−0.0334
(−3.96)
−0.0323
(−3.81)
−0.0333
(−4.09)
−0.0323
(−3.96)
Population −0.0071
(−2.95)
−0.0086
(−3.30)
−0.0043
(−1.76)
−0.0048
(−1.92)
−0.007
(−2.61)
−0.0093
(−3.05)
Government 0.0183
(2.55)
0.0190
(2.67)
0.0208
(2.79)
0.0193
(2.54)
0.0183
(2.51)
0.0165
(2.19)
Terms of Trade (TOT) 0.0004
(2.99)
−0.0003
(−0.58)
0.0004
(2.17)
0.00002
(0.03)
Export Concentration Index (EXP) 0.0352
(1.94)
0.0078
(0.24)
0.0014
(0.06)
−0.0424
(−1.08)
TOT*OPEN 0.00001
(1.42)
8.10E − 06
(0.79)
EXP*OPEN 0.0004
(1.00)
0.0005
(1.05)
N-obs 60 60 60 60 60 60
Adj-R2 0.40 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.40
Table 23: Less developed countries: Government, openness and proxies for risk
